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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (j) . This case is an appeal from the 
District Court and has been transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court properly admit Exhibit 3? 
2. Did the trial court properly allow oral evidence of the 
stock purchase agreement? 
3. Did the appellant fail to prove that the purchase 
contract was illegal, void and unenforceable under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 16-10-5? 
STATEMENT OF DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-319: 
Statute of Frauds. 
A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by 
way of action or defense unless 
(a) there is some writing signed by the party against 
whom enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or 
broker sufficient to indicate that a contract has been made 
for sale of a stated quantity of described securities at a 
defined or stated price; or 
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(b) delivery of the security has been accepted or 
payment has been made but the contract is enforceable 
under this provision only to the extent of such 
delivery or payment; or 
(c) within a reasonable time a writing in 
confirmation of the sale or purchase and sufficient 
against the sender under paragraph (a) has been 
received by the party against whom enforcement is 
sought and he has failed to send written objection to 
its contents within ten days after its receipt; or 
(d) the party against whom enforcement is sought 
admits in his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court 
that a contract was made for sale of a stated quantity 
of described securities at a defined or stated price. 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-5: 
Right of corporation to acquire and dispose of its own 
shares. 
A corporation shall have the right to purchase, take, 
receive or otherwise acquire, hold, own, pledge, transfer or 
otherwise dispose of its own shares, but purchase of its own 
shares, whether direct or indirect, shall be made only to the 
extent of unreserved and unrestricted earned surplus available 
therefor, and, if the articles of incorporation so permit or with 
the affirmative vote of the holders of at least two-thirds of all 
shares entitled to vote thereon, to the extent of unreserved and 
unrestricted capital surplus available therefor. 
To the extent that earned surplus or capital surplus is used 
as the means of the corporation's right to purchase its own 
shares, such surplus shall be restricted so long as such shares 
are held as treasury shares, and upon the disposition or 
cancellation of any such shares the restriction shall be removed 
to the extent of the cost to the corporation of the shares so 
disposed of or cancelled. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing limitation, a corporation may 
purchase or otherwise acquire its own shares for the purpose of: 
(a) eliminating fractional shares. 
(b) collecting or compromising indebtedness to 
the corporation. 
(c) paying dissenting shareholders entitled to 
payment for their shares under the provisions of this 
act. 
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(d) effecting, subject to the other provisions 
of this act, the retirement of its redeemable shares by 
redemption or by purchase at not to exceed the 
redemption price. 
No purchase of or payment for its own shares shall be made 
at a time when the corporation is insolvent or when such purchase 
or payment would make it insolvent. 
Rule 803, Utah Rules of Evidence: 
Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even 
though the declarant is available as a witness: 
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A 
memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any 
form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions or 
diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 
information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if 
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the 
testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, 
unless the source of information or the method of 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness. The term "business" as used in this 
paragraph includes business, institution, association, 
profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 
whether or not conducted for profit. 
(24) Other exceptions. A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purpose of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
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prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant. 
Rule 804(b)(5) Utah Rules of Evidence 
Heresay exceptions. 
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the 
declarant is unavailable as a witness: 
(5) Other exceptions. A statement not 
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions 
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the 
statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; 
(B) the statement is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence which the 
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and 
(C) the general purposes of these rules and the 
interests of justice will best be served by admission 
of the statement into evidence. However, a statement 
may not be admitted under this exception unless the 
proponent of it makes known to the adverse party 
sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to 
provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to 
prepare to meet it, his intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name 
and address of the declarant. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Respondent has no objection to the statement of the case 
presented by appellant. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A bench trial was conducted before Judge Frank G. Noel on 
October 24-25, 1988. The court dismissed the fraud claim against 
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all defendants. The court found that there was a valid contract 
between Michael Klekas and Citram Corporation for the purchase of 
22,000 shares of stock at $2.25 per share to be paid for within 
3 0 days or by February 26, 1987. 
The court further found that Citram Corporation breached the 
contract by failing to make payment for the stock and awarded 
plaintiff $49,500.00 plus costs against Citram Corporation. 
Appellant has appealed the trial court's decision. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 27, 1987, a meeting was held in Murray, Utah, 
attended by Jerry Spicer, Michael Klekas, Jeff Van Os, Date 
Olcott Thompson and a Mr. L. C. Green. In this meeting, an 
agreement was reached whereby Citram Corporation through its 
agent, Spicer, agreed to purchase 22,000 shares of Citram stock 
from Klekas at $2.25 per share. TR: 104. 
At the January 27, 1987 meeting, Thompson took notes 
regarding the agreement between Citram and Klekas. TR: 173. 
Mr. Thompson's notes represent an agreement between Citram and 
Klekas wherein Citram was to purchase 22,000 shares at 2-1/4 in 
3 0 days. TR; 174. 
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A written memorandum of the oral stock purchase agreement 
was prepared by Van Wagoner & Stevens, the attorneys for Klekas 
on January 28, 1987, and was signed by Klekas and delivered via 
Federal Express on January 29, 1987, to Citram Corporation's 
address. Spicer admitted that Citram Corporation received the 
document. TR: 12• 
At trial, evidence came in relating to the agreement between 
Citram and Klekas. A confirmation letter from Klekas to Citram 
was introduced. TR: 270. Mr. Thompson's notes taken at the 
January 27, 1987 meeting were introduced. Id. A Federal Express 
Summary showing delivery of the letter was introduced. Id. 
Janis Conger, the office manager from respondent's attorneys' 
office, testified as to her experience with Federal Express and 
that she kept the Federal Express Suirimary in the regular course 
of business. TR: 33-34. 
The trial court found that there was a contract between 
Klekas and Citram for the purchase of 22,000 shares of stock at 
$2.25 per share, to be paid for within 30 days. The court 
further found that the contract was breached by Citram finding in 
favor of Klekas in the amount of $49,500 plus costs. TR: 320. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court properly admitted Exhibit 3, the Federal 
Express Summary, as a business record of Van Wagoner & Stevens. 
The foundational testimony provided by Ms. Conger illustrated 
that she had knowledge of the business customs of Federal 
Express and that the summary was kept by her in the usual course 
of business. It was shown at trial that the business records, 
exception to the hearsay rule was satisfied. The trial judge 
was correct in admitting this evidence. 
The Federal Express Summary creates a rebuttable presumption 
that Citram Corporation received the confirmation letter on 
January 24, 1987, and thus within a reasonable time. Appellant 
was unable to rebut this presumption at trial. The trial court 
was correct in holding that Utah Code Ann. § 70A-8-319 was 
satisfied. It cannot be shown that this decision was clearly 
erroneous. 
Appellant has offered no evidence to show that the 
corporation was insolvent at the time of the agreement. 
Contracts are presumed legal and appellant has failed to rebut 
this presumption. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED THE FEDERAL EXPRESS 
SUMMARY-
Appelleutt «n :jues +-•-•, * t 4 h* tiidi c i i < <i in .nliiii I I. i nq 
Exhib.i - ummary unjv.r the business records 
except. .*-; hearsay r -u (8-.»"i Utah Rules of Evidence) 
because respondent l • • * *u ^ * . j-:^t ' o 
admi *- r** .. , v unci m a t >• • s '••.'[•or 
f oundatic i im , i • <*_ . , *n: -.• .*1 >. idmissi Federal 
Express Summary. 
A. The Federal Express Summary was Properly A Irai \ \ ™\ 
Under the Business Records Exception 
The trial <*- •-•.•i » m u m 1 1 . | ni r • • •• 1 ' ' i< ecteidL Express 
raimm.i 1 ', «i > ' 1 . . ;,...,.. records except.; on. Utah Rules of 
Evidence. Rule 803-i states that document 
"Kt;:. events, conditio agnoses,#/ made at 
nccui 1 v iw tr L. i in* . r » n* person *nt-h 
Kn-w'iedge M T n- t ;ent • ! rorr *nformatir> 
person w i r h KHOVV] e H< . ooui be 
testimony r « rv ustodiai o* »> niiie 
excluded f»--*rr • -^MI*- ^niirr^ .1 inf 01 mar ; o>* 
Lrcumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
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trustworthiness." The t;ru . ouit *<u)';-J M s . Conger's testimony 
to be credible, trustw . . * *.rc Federal 
:
 n evidence. 
In :Tnited States -1 /^i «-f *"- V Uxiiei ; - -.a '8 th ^ : 
•.! .ertain delivery i n v o i c e as 1 - * h.: t t rir: admissi •. >r\ •. i 
business records was proper where the foundat 1 
though not the o * o e , vv ci S l d l f l l *. 1 3 1 " :-v \ :.-il 
proc<- i.i*-, .. , W , ...... \ i ' i- ; rdness ar.ti • : •<- "-ne 
who received t'* receipts '•;**.• 
event r - f T J I, . uie .-v .dencc i t 
it i, o:.^.,,v..c trustworthy under Rule 803 M ' < * -%> i > I 
the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id - \ * <•, i : 
and ou- • * 11*j ulan Rules of Evidence. 
Anr , - case which support - , i - . >n ^^ 
the Fede) present case is United States 
v, Ullrich, ,* < *. ••• i * <* *, .'* n Ullrich, the ivmrl 
of Appeal:1 affirmed the defendant' • " hc?I.iJ that Jl !,-. 
records c .. . arship from whom t::•.* automobile had 
been stoi *- proper] >' aiiritted u ; 'N^PPSS record" 
objectioi j .r oefendant that th* < oundat^-i; 
becausv .. prepared I1 •< utomob.Me 
it'ii'.^ r.i.,,, 1 he ccurt st<it"cul that n L though the v/ cuments 
furnished originally ! r- -« uuier iustrated 
that - ho requLri; • )urse : ' - iealership's 
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business as accounting document- •. * i nt rqratfMl M^, id 
records of the den 1 r-rsh i | ml . : • I , at. '/J, 
Finally,, in United States v. Flomt, ~ ^ ? ' 
1 9 7 7 ) , t h e coin l in hi I 11 1 I lii i t \ A • . adequate foundation for 
r,ic> admission of certain business records even though the records 
were invoices received and held I ', -n- i^ mp.*! i " i MMjiilar 
course of bus i n^ 0. , ' '^•»HI JJI»spared and sent by another company 
cM ' ' testimony ol the preparing company was offered. The court 
stated: 
Although the usual case involves an employee of the 
preparing business laying the necessary foundation 
under 803(6), the law is clear that under circumstances 
which demonstrate trustworthiness it is not necessary 
that the one who kept the record, on even had 
supervision over their preparation testify. That the 
trial judge has a broad zone of discretion in 
evidentiary matters is a basic principle , . , [and] 
the court below did not cross the line in finding that 
the foundation required D\ the Federal Rules of 
Evidence was SUDD! I PH >^  :*"ness testifying at 
trial. 
id. dt 1183-84 (citations omitted). 
\\ \ * "> fr^1 rc"> ' allowed "the Federal 
Express Summai » i nt c evidence in t-\ r because Ms. ConeKJ«T '"*« • d 
not testify that the said Exhii'i"! ".M |s spared as <\ business 
recora .ill ID tact, testified it was merely a nopy 
of * recorc t^ Federal Express that was delivered i- irs i v 
roail • " Appellant1 s Brief, at |i:i9 . Appe J I ant u rges t In,11 f hi.--
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record must be generated by t }•*•• company vl 
However, neither t ' • i «<p; 
a p fit m e hi 
j;)"L . I .Jo ^ U p p o l t. H I S 
National Lab*.. K^^.^-'^ m^/i- nrst Termite Control 
Compel, , ..i^.. -4' - /- * * ::''oi t< i y if i.•!;.»• .r^l^od 
a witnes;- vlr >^ i foundation 
reco'- . » esponsible 
f
 t ;_, i.. . * .x- freight ni; i i 4 lestic^ *. *• t n« *'. * 
interest ct ^  t • ,f accuracy =»r* * * . ^ 
shipment --:...* « * e shipping practices 
questi.* ns foundational witness was - : i pr* --r.* 
positic : ','onnpr vTt - ha.} . •* . ^ 
date ' <_ >. i , xpress Letter ^ * •>*-
h the practices of Federal ." j z - J 4 
T
" United States y. olinger 
1985 
cone* 
perse ,. i participated 
decumer „._ _ ^^^, ^citati -• 
state tl'Mf • 
creaf ior 
records exception 
. > - '.s * n i l . I lhi.i '*' 
ma i ntennih'i I i 
(.-• i nui t went out i a 
Obviously, such a requirement would eviscerate the 
business records exception, since no document could be 
admitted unless the preparer (ma possibly c. i aers 
involved in the format: IJ- ••.• in-: rjcess) 
personally testified as to its creatio Rather , the 
phrase "other qualified witness" * ..-. 803(6) is to 
be given "the broadest possible interpretation"—the 
witness need only be someone who "understands the 
system,.." 
Id. at fifM 1 I I I" "I". 11i.iI i. 11. /* M Berger, Weinstein's 
Fvidem* || u ib (<>) | a? \ n 803-178" i i M couit properly 
admitted the Federal Express Summar uli-i t hr I iu;". J ii< s, r ecords 
exception. 
I* clear that the- admiss * ijt" express 
Summarc - oneous. \ -\ lanis 
* -j *r *.-.. vc. i i,i i \<:T A M . • h- practi* *=-s .-*« t-^aj. r.xprpss 
and K^r' •o Fedora' Express ^ui « nurse of the 
I i / hp court properly admitted the Summary 
t r:a; court r«-i, * ' * * - * i. * *
 t . <press Summary under 
kuxes c 
POINT II: "I 'HE TRIAI, COURT PROPERLY AI..U>WM> iiHAI, EVIDENCE OF THE 
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT-
properly allowed 1c>-f,^.cny oncerning oral 
communications ,-ru * tatement. .r..i-i« meetii • • 
port iet. lanuer1- * *; . ,„ , i. L }*••. ~" *; 
aqree.^nt u< ;v,** -: s^. i:* -« • 'nt and appellee, but rather was n i wc»d 
i nto evidence \- - foundational * ^ D O S O S I .uppnii ,ir I ijive 
credibility * : .greement. 
Appeliai.t inues * . , • » < -: ,.,; / 1 ]_ 
evidence e^.ciii n i e s <* r;t 
ii _ ;>_ ...t Lolied * ,• »*^ applied' :«- tatute of prauds s^*— ~" en 
was met. .r simply u Uie 
cippellan ? argument. Even so, as- ^.rguo : •-\ 
P., ; it ^utriciei." : ier ^*e b^+^r*" t 
satisfied that Section 70A-8-319| \ •) anuaiv 
2 8, 19F f fn:i- Klekas rr :itram and * K* 
handwritten notes Thompson taken „ wi*^ January 
meeting). 
•"rial t V .u,rt found tha* c sb^-^ ; >n 
*nfirmat i - • ' ' n^,.,,* ^  . -
• " "'• r e c e i p t of; v,h* r- K • /€•• Federal 
Express Summary. Appellant contends that subsed 
m:?t because squires >ni.rmation must be 
re-- rpason.une t jm< i * ; p.ir* -gainst whom 
er . ;roemei.: . Lsoinjht ;i * ioa^ t- before *-!*» 
complaint. Appellant1 s hJLtvL- ,. > i^ .L_ . 
Appellant irgu'fs tn,;j "-• .1.1 *• re."4 « 
person shov ^xhibi *,cepted the federal 
Rxpress package, one .* K^rtn.1 Appellant#s Brief 
Appellant argues even it the Federal Express Summai * • y 
admitted, thorp is s N I I n • .J-..-'* "I.-it ^ r ^ p i , ^ -iter 
\ easonabi :ime because Goforth was - proved r i- m 
agent 01 employee - \ c>.\ rain-
 L|' ; . LUkl^? Brie: 
Appellar 4 •: t e r ieposition testimony, 
:i ' :^p i -J*. i uUi;! J t i t*u receiving the letter J •• s. i f ? » r* i ent 
because Spicer couldn't remember when he •..".. 
therefor* •. •- <^  * , ,11 before : ne 
a 'was commenced. This argument is without merit. 
The use • 1 '•< • i • f I < > t . i I KxpreiJiJ Summary as evidence + ! a : a 
letter has been received is analogous to a return of sf-rvice 01 
process. The return stands -j evidence I 11.11 , r i t a i. i i -1 * n.'odures 
'•a"e bee^ -^ very likely that t he person to 
:H:: vea
 A * , « el*., ./1- t lu* so TV i* ;e documents, 
I or « ?* .11111111 1 11 I 111 1 he Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
r t * oo i * . t>e . v : oe t * 1 . r,. K , person 5 P I \ 
p l a c e i j j u d t ; V\ * < -> . * i . <.j J M \ . ,i ,A 
a i s c ! i n a , , ;et vi< e : s i* j o m p l i s h e d 
m a n n e r , t L t a i l i a a v . t • * . ^ : vvL ^ ;- ^ p o r r r • 
^
i ;
"
v ] T
 . n - i a r b ^*. D u i : • . . u j ^ b u± . x l_ i . P r o c e d u r e 
" "'" r-\n^ ** i t l ^ ' i p a p e r " < road* 
r . : v e r n i M .. T ' f f < i r ' * : : 
person n a ^ q ^ ->-* * s a v i n g 
c c . ,• ., , o s a s sume •'. *t ^A^. 
1 4 
statutory procedures are complied with,, k ir '« ory likely that 
i he serv i re of process l e i ve«' |»t o c e d u r e s a r e 
i i )i 11 \\n* "i i, I ii( i c t u n i of se i. * I p r o o f ox ser v i c e . 
I i it a c t J c 'i: :i, I::l u = de ] i ei : } person ^or Federal 
1 -i •«•-:=- ... ,.t letter with Ms. Goforth who signed for the 
letter. Spicer has never Jisput^d *-h-* .^- iii^ i 
letter was i-:4' • uress. p, v:ei , • »n 
a ., *. . leL-f-i*- t :»*- letter, but he does not remember 
wher.. 'IK; 12. 
1\. ..u-.i^ Express Summary cieates a rebuttable presumpt M-
that Spicer receixed ti.f :<*'*--• ~'*r f 
the sale o .c.iit:.- a- Federa ress 
nummary, .Tui.^ u Appellan* ffered no evidence 
whatsoever to rebut that presumption. 
"me Lixal ^,o,ir+- proper"! r reeeh^j r ,<-> Jerr^T meetir-
statute ot frauds -;r^  -+ *ds HUL 
testim* hase agreement;. 
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POINT III: THE DEFENDANTS FAILED IU PROVE In A I i 1, PURCHASE 
CONTRACT WAS ILLEGAL, VOID *) K UN KN »«* -1!, I /'. I \ IM UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN, § 1 6-10-5. 
A Appe 11 an t Ca n J to I; Ra ise I ssues on A p p< . \ I I 11 11 W H'e 
not Raised at Trial. • 
Appei-.i'..: argues that "there w-»:> ;^  evid-nce ; roducec u; 
trial tc ;;now t na • *itram had ever earned any - i 
enable * ' • .€•(] , \ i.urp..^ aw* •* • a o I * . purr.nase it.s 
c ::i:... . " Appellant ' s Brief at 16, Appellant first, raised 
this argument ,i . - . * irqumrr*- "•<•': e 
District . . . iioi ^  was evidence . •" the 
record support. ni-\ \ s coiitentic-n. 
Appr'ii 11 ii'iutui in 11 ypicer had no authority to "* ' r. •. 
corporation I <i contract to purchase stock because ther^ 
resolution .... , i n * TR: A l l * 
appellr
 tl.^ -v • , corporate code provides 
T
-.~i' . -yi^orat ion carina! ; .rchase Lti- i shares without e.'irnprj 
--'pi^1- - ' •"» . I MM In i1 111: chase its own 
snares. . :. ..si-^  -. i,. . 
appea -mpe 1 ] • 
the -J- -v < 
Code Ann, < i • •*. 
cannot be raised de no\ 
Sue: i * - r 
• 1 . 
p u r e n a s e ^^ 
r.. icnaiM i o l a t e s Utah 
- a i ^ e J below d t LI 
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B. Appellant Has Failed to Meet its Burden of Proof. 
Appellant misunderstands the burden of proof with respect to 
proving the illegality of the contract. Since it is the 
appellant who asserts illegality as an affirmative defense to 
enforcement of the contract, it is appellant's burden to prove 
that, in fact, the contract was illegal. 
Section 16-10-5 of the Utah Code allows a corporation to 
purchase its own stock provided that there is unreserved earned 
surplus and provided that, at the time of the purchase, the 
corporation is not insolvent or would not become insolvent by the 
purchase. While the insolvency of the corporation may invalidate 
the transaction, "the burden of proof is on the corporation to 
show insolvency or that the transaction will render the 
corporation insolvent." 18B Am. Jur. 2d § 2073. See also 
Vowteras v. Argo Compressor Service Corporation, 441 N.Y.S. 2d 
562 (1981) (burden not met where there was no information in the 
record indicating whether the corporation could have obtained 
financing in order to satisfy its obligations, and given that the 
corporation appeared to have a true surplus, there was a 
substantial likelihood that it could have obtained such 
financing). 
Appellant argues that since the financial statements of 
Citram dated July 23, 1986, indicate that Citram had no earnings 
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or losses for the years ending December 31, 1983, 1984 and 1985, 
and showed a net loss of $94,848-40 through July 23, 1986, there 
was no evidence at trial to show that Citram had ever earned any 
income which would enable it to have earned surplus available to 
purchase its own shares. Appellants Brief at 16. However, it 
is appellants burden to prove the lack of earned surplus because 
he raises it as a defense to avoid enforcement of the contract. 
Appellant offered no proof at trial showing that Citram did not 
have any surplus to purchase the shares at the date the agreement 
was made, January 27, 1987. The only financial documentation 
offered at trial was offered by plaintiff/respondent in Exhibit 
7, however, this documentation did not contain any financial 
information relevant to the date of the agreement. The date of 
the agreement was approximately six months subsequent to any 
financial information reflected in Exhibit 7. Appellant has 
failed to offer any evidence which establishes that the 
corporation was insolvent or did not have surplus available on 
January 27, 1987. 
Finally, the case cited by appellant to support his argument 
is inapposite. Appellant cites the court to White v. Western 
Empire Life Insurance Company, 11 Utah 2d 227, 357 P.2d 483 
(1960) for the proposition that the Utah Court has held that a 
purchase by a corporation of its own shares "cannot be allowed 
unless the court makes a specific finding that the corporation 
has sufficient earned surplus to allow for the purchase." 
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Appellant's Brief at 17. This is a misleading reference to 
White. Nowhere in White does the court hold, as appellant 
states it does, nor is the language cited by appellant even found 
in White. White involved a purchaser of corporate stock who 
brought suit against the corporation to enforce an agreement made 
by the president of the corporation to resell the purchaser's 
stock at a designated price increase. The corporation argued 
that the agreement by the corporation to repurchase its own stock 
was void as a matter of law and that it was error for the trial 
court to find that the contract was not void. The court, citing 
Title 16-12-16(f), Utah Code Ann. (1953) (apparently the 
predecessor to 16-10-5), stated that "the [trial] court found, on 
substantial evidence, that it would not impair the assets 
lacquired as consideration for the sale of shares, in which event 
repurchases are exempt from the interdiction against corporate 
purchase of its own shares." Id. at 484. The court held that 
the corporation had to accept responsibility for the agreement to 
resell. 
Appellant has utterly failed to show any evidence in the 
record which would affect the validity of the trial court's 
decision. 
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C. The Stock Purchase Agreement is Presumed Legal. 
It is a general rule of construction that contracts are 
presumed legal and enforceable. Walsh v. Schlecht, 429 U.S. 401 
(1977) . See also W.R. Hall Transp. &. Stor. Co. v. Gunnison 
Mining Co., 388 P.2d 768 (Colo. 1964), ("courts do not presume an 
intention on the part of parties to a contract that it be 
performed in an unlawful manner when, under the contract, a 
lawful performance may be accomplished"); Fisk v. Newsum, 513 
P. 2d 1035 (Wash. 1973) (the statute prohibiting a corporation 
from purchasing its own stock except out of unreserved and 
unrestricted capital surplus does not prevent an agreement for 
the future purchase of stock out of earned surplus; it only 
prohibits the actual purchase if, at the time the purchase is 
made, there is insufficient unreserved and unrestricted capital 
surplus to do so) . Thus, there is a presumption that a stock 
purchase agreement is legal and that the intention of the 
parties is not to form an illegal contract. Appellant offered no 
evidence to rebut this presumption. The trial court was correct 
in upholding the contract. 
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CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
There has been no showing that the trial judge was incorrect in 
his interpretation of the law nor has it been shown that his 
factual decision was clearly erroneous. 
DATED: June 26, 1989. 
VAN WAGONER & STEVENS 
Mark 0. Van Wagoner 
Christopher J. Condie 
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